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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RE-
FUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO INTRODUCE TESTI-
MONY OF ALIBI WITNESS WAS NEITHER AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION NOR A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS WHEN
THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH PROCEDURAL
NOTICE OF ALIBI RULE. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d
29, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114 (1983).
Defendant was indicted for robbery with a deadly weapon and use
of a handgun in the commission of a felony.' At trial, he attempted to
call an alibi witness following the conclusion of the prosecution's case.2
The prosecution argued that this testimony should be excluded because
of the defendant's failure to identify the alibi witness following a re-
quest by the prosecution under Maryland Rule 741. 3 The prosecution
nevertheless offered to withdraw its objection to the alibi testimony if
the court would grant a continuance, thereby affording the prosecution
a fair opportunity to investigate the alibi witness's background and his
proposed testimony.4 The trial judge refused to grant a continuance
after learning that the terms of six of the jurors would expire prior to
the resumption of the case.5 The trial judge thus excluded the proffered
alibi testimony,6 and the defendant was convicted.7 In an unreported
opinion, the court of special appeals affirmed the conviction.8 In Talia-
ferro v. State,9 the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the actions of
the trial judge since the alibi witness was not identified until the last
1. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 399, 456 A.2d 29, 42, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114
(1983). Although the defendant was indicted for other related offenses, these of-
fenses were nol prossed by the state.
2. Taliaferro, 295 Md. at 381, 456 A.2d at 32.
3. Referred to as the notice of alibi rule, Maryland Rule 741 (d)(3) provides that the
defendant must furnish the name and address of each individual he intends to call
as a witness to show the defendant was not present at the time, place, and date
designated by the state. MD. R.P. 741(d)(3) (Supp. 1983).
4. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 400, 456 A.2d 29, 42, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114
(1983).
5. Taliaferro, 295 Md. at 400, 456 A.2d at 42.
6. A trial court may exclude alibi evidence under Maryland Rule 741(g). Rule
741(g) provides:
Upon motion and for good cause shown, the court may order that
specified disclosures be restricted. If at any time during the proceedings
it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to com-
ply with this Rule or an order issued pursuant to this Rule, the court
may order that party to permit the discovery of the matters not previ-
ously disclosed, strike the testimony to which the undisclosed matter re-
lates, grant a reasonable continuance, prohibit the party from
introducing in evidence the matter not disclosed, grant a mistrial, or
enter any other order appropriate under the circumstances. All material
and information to which a party is entitled must be disclosed in time to
permit beneficial use thereof.
MD. R.P. 741(g) (Supp. 1983).
7. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 377-78, 456 A.2d 29, 30-31, cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2114 (1983).
8. Taliaferro, 295 Md. at 378, 456 A.2d at 31.
9. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d 29, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114 (1983).
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day of trial.'" Therefore, the court concluded that the preclusion of the
testimony was neither an abuse of discretion nor a violation of due
process. 1
Notice of alibi rules essentially require that a defendant submit to
a limited form of pretrial discovery by the state whenever he intends to
proffer an alibi defense at trial.' 2 Since 1927,11 a majority of jurisdic-
tions have adopted notice of alibi provisions' 4 and have advanced sev-
eral reasons for their justification.' 5 First, notice of alibi provisions
serve to prevent surprise at trial.' 6 Second, the notice requirement de-
ters false alibis because defendants are aware that the information fur-
nished will be investigated before trial.'7 Third, "pretrial investigation
results in a saving of money and trial time."' 8 For example, a prosecu-
tor may dismiss the case premised upon the sufficiency of the alibi evi-
dence.19 Fourth, "alibis which are presented at trial are accorded more
respect."'2' Finally, notice of alibi statutes provide more liberal discov-
ery in criminal cases 2' because both parties have the opportunity to
discover the other party's witnesses and thereby reduce the possibility
of surprise at trial.
In the majority of states that have adopted the notice of alibi rule,
10. Id at 378, 456 A.2d at 31.
11. Id "Due process" in this context means the application to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. Brief for Appellant at
7, Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d 29, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114
(1983).
12. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80 (1970).
13. Id at 81. In 1927 Michigan passed the first statute concerning alibis. See MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28.1043 to .1044 (1954); Epstein, Advance Notice of41ibi 55 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 29, 30 n.ll (1964).
14. A requirement for notice of an alibi defense currently exists in 35 states and in the
District of Columbia. For a complete list of these jurisdictions, see Taliaferro v.
State, 295 Md. 376, 387-88 nn.10-14, 456 A.2d 29, 35-36 nn.l0-14,cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 2114 (1983).
15. One author has compiled reasons justifying the notice of alibi requirement from
his survey of decisional law. Epstein, supra note 13, at 31-32. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland accepted these reasons in Taliaferro. Taliaferro v. State, 295
Md. 376, 385-86, 456 A.2d 29, 34-35, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114 (1983).
16. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473 (1973) (state statute that did not provide
for reciprocal discovery deemed unconstitutional since justice is best served by a
system of liberal discovery that gives both parties the opportunity to discover the
other party's witnesses and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial); see
also Epstein, supra note 13, at 31.
17. See State v. Davis, 63 Hawaii 191, 624 P.2d 376 (1981) (defendant's alibi witness
was not permitted to testify because defendant failed to notify the state of his
intention to rely on an alibi defense); see also Epstein, supra note 13, at 31.
18. State v. Davis, 63 Hawaii 191, 194, 624 P.2d 376, 379 (1981); see also Epstein,
supra note 13, at 32.
19. In addition, since the prosecutor will not be surprised at trial by the alibi witness,
there is no need for a continuance at trial. Epstein, supra note 13, at 32.
20. Id; see State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937) (notice of alibi safeguards
the defense from fraud and perjury).
21. Epstein, supra note 13, at 32.
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a defendant's failure to comply with that procedural rule permits the
exclusion of the alibi testimony.22 In United States v. Myers,2 3 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit enumerated the
following factors a court should consider in determining the propriety
of the trial court's discretionary exclusion of the alibi testimony:
24
(1) The amount of prejudice that resulted from the failure to
disclose, (2) the reason for nondisclosure, (3) the extent to
which the harm caused by nondisclosure was mitigated by
subsequent events, (4) the weight of the properly admitted ev-
idence supporting the defendant's guilt, and (5) other relevant
factors ansing out of the circumstances of the case.
25
The Myers factors were applied by the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. White. 26 At issue in White was whether the district court
abused its discretion in precluding an alibi witness's testimony based
on the defendant's failure to comply with the notice of alibi rule. 27 The
defendant attempted to justify his noncompliance based upon his igno-
rance as to the witness's current location.28 The White court rejected
this justification and concluded that the defendant was required to
name the potential witness. As a result, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding the alibi testimony.29
The Supreme Court has expressly reserved decision on the consti-
tutionality of excluding alibi testimony based on the defendant's failure
to comply with a notice of alibi rule. 30 Other federal and state courts
have held that an exclusion sanction does not violate a person's consti-
22. Of the 36 jurisdictions that employ a requirement for notice of an alibi defense,
only Maine, Minnesota, and Washington lack an express statutory provision per-
mitting the trial judge to exclude the testimony of an alibi witness. Taliaferro v.
State, 295 Md. 376, 387 n.10, 456 A.2d 29, 35 n.10, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114
(1983). In addition, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit exclusion of
the testimony as a sanction. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (d) (federal notice of alibi pro-
vision). The federal notice of alibi rule is essentially the same as the comparable
Maryland rule. Middleton v. State, 49 Md. App. 286, 289 n.l, 431 A.2d 734, 736
n.l, cert. denied, 291 Md. 779 (1981).
23. 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977).
24. Id at 1043. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland adopted the Myers factors
in 1981. Middleton v. State, 49 Md. App. 286, 289-90, 431 A.2d 734, 736, cert.
denied, 291 Md. 779 (1981).
25. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1043 (5th Cir. 1977).
26. 583 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1978).
27. Id at 900. The notice of alibi provision in White was FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, the
applicable rule in federal criminal cases.
28. White, 583 F.2d at 901-02. Similarly, Taliaferro's justification for not complying
with the notice provision was that he did not know the whereabouts of the alibi
witness. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 384, 456 A.2d 29, 33-34, cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 2114 (1983).
29. White, 583 F.2d at 902.
30. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n.4 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
83 n.14 (1970). The Court, however, has recognized that it "is a question raising
sixth amendment issues which we have no occasion to explore." Id at 83 n. 14; see
infra note 35.
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tutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his own
behalf.3 ' These courts reason "that the alibi rule does not prevent a
defendant from compelling the attendance of witnesses; rather, the rule
provides reasonable conditions for the presentation of alibi
evidence."32
Originally, the source of the right to compulsory process was the
due process clause of the Constitution.33 In Washington v. Texas,34
however, the Court held that the right to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses and offer their testimony constitutes the right to present a de-
fense that is guaranteed by the sixth amendment.35 In so holding, the
Washington Court announced that sixth amendment rights apply to
state criminal proceedings through the fourteenth amendment.36
In Taliaferro v. State, 37 the Court of Appeals of Maryland was
presented with the threshold question of whether the trial judge abused
his discretion in imposing the sanction of exclusion to the defendant's
alibi witness.38 In analyzing this question, Judge Rodowsky39 focused
on the trial court's reasoning that the defendant was far from diligent
in his efforts to provide the state with his alibi witness's name and ad-
dress.4 Maryland Rule 741(g) 41 clearly empowered the trial judge to
exclude the testimony of the defendant's alibi witness.42 The defendant
31. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 524 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Rider v. Crouse,
357 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1966); Hartman v. State, 176 Ind. App. 375, 376 N.E.2d
100 (1978); Bush v. State, 203 Kan. 494, 454 P.2d 429 (1969); People v. Jackson, 71
Mich. App. 395, 249 N.W.2d 132 (1976); State v. Smith, 88 N.M. 541, 543 P.2d 834
(1975). Compulsory process means that the state is prohibited from prosecuting a
defendant without supplying him the power to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his favor. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process:. A Unied Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 587 (1978).
32. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 389, 456 A.2d 29, 36, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114
(1983); see also State v. Dodd, 101 Ariz. 234, 237, 418 P.2d 571, 574 (1966); State
v. Roberts, 226 Kan. 740, 744, 602 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1979); State v. Smith, 88 N.M.
541, 543, 543 P.2d 834, 836 (1975).
33. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967). The fifth amendment is the due
process clause for the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The fourteenth amendment encompasses the
due process clause for the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (seizure of personal property without prior
notice or opportunity to challenge the seizure violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment).
34. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
35. Id at 19. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
37. 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d 29, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114 (1983).
38. Taliaferro, 295 Md. at 378, 456 A.2d at 30-31.
39. Judge Rodowsky wrote the majority opinion for a divided court. Judges Cole and
Davidson joined in Judge Eldridge's dissenting opinion.
40. Taliaferro, 295 Md. at 383-85, 456 A.2d at 33-34.
41. MD. R.P. 741(g) (Supp. 1983). For the full text of this rule, see supra note 6.
42. Taliaferro, 295 Md. at 378, 456 A.2d at 30-3 1.
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decided not to testify4 3 and was subsequently convicted of various
offenses."
The Taliaferro court reasoned that abuse of discretion is the ap-
propriate standard for reviewing a sanction imposed by a trial judge for
noncompliance with a notice of alibi rule.45 The court concluded that
since the trial judge had the authority to exclude the proffered alibi
testimony, he did not abuse his discretion.
The Taliaferro decision comports with the majority of those juris-
dictions that apply the notice of alibi rules. Courts have consistently
held that a trial court's refusal to circumvent the notice requirement is
neither an abuse of discretion nor a violation of due process.4 6 When
the defendant violates a notice of alibi provision, any sanction rests
within the sole discretion of the trial judge.4 7 Accordingly, appellate
courts are reluctant to overturn a trial judge's ruling absent a clear
abuse of discretion.48 Indeed, appellate courts rarely find an abuse of
discretion when the trial judge precludes alibi testimony based on non-
compliance with a notice requirement.49
In Taliaferro, the adversarial system imposed an obligation on the
defendant to comply with the Maryland procedural rule prior to being
afforded his constitutional protections. Courts have occasionally found
justification for the infringement of a person's constitutional rights if
the infringement satisfies a compelling state interest.5 0 Arguably, the
state has a compelling interest in notice of alibi provisions because ali-
bis can easily be fabricated.51 The state must therefore be protected
against a party who conceals his witnesses until trial.52 In addition, the
43. Id at 383, 456 A.2d at 33.
44. The defendant was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a hand-
gun in the commission of a felony. Id. at 377, 456 A.2d at 30.
45. Id. at 388, 456 A.2d at 36.
46. See supra note 31; infra note 48.
47. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 388, 456 A.2d 29, 36, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114
(1983). In State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1979), the court stated that
"the trial court is in the best position to determine whether any harm has resulted
from the particular violation and the extent to which the harm can be eliminated
or otherwise alleviated." Id at 373.
48. See United States v. White, 583 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gil-
lings, 568 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978); State v. Hunt, 118
Ariz. 431, 577 P.2d 717 (1978).
49. See Cox v. State, 219 So. 2d 762, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v. Selbach,
268 Wis. 538, 540, 68 N.W.2d 37, 38 (1955). But see Williams v. State, 97 Nev. 1,
2, 620 P.2d 1263, 1264 (1981) (a court's preclusion of defendant's alibi testimony
because his alibi notice was belatedly filed constituted an abuse of discretion); see
also infra note 61 (Maryland case holding the trial judge abused his discretion in
precluding alibi testimony because of the defendant's failure to comply with the
Maryland notice requirement).
50. Comment, The Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional Right to
Present a Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342, 1353 (1972).
51. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970); see Epstein, supra note 13, at 32.
52. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970).
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state unquestionably has an interest in ensuring the reliability of
testimony.
Even when an interest is deemed compelling, it remains the court's
function to determine whether adequate alternative sanctions exist to
stimulate the pretrial disclosure of an alibi witness." One alternative
to excluding evidence is the granting of a continuance.54 Courts will
only grant a continuance, however, if a defendant shows good cause for
his failure to comply with the notice of alibi provisions." In Maryland,
a court will not grant a continuance unless the defendant can show that
he made diligent and proper efforts to secure the evidence. 56 In Talia-
ferro, the trial court found a lack of diligence by the defendant because
of his failure to provide the state with the name and address of his alibi
witness.57 The defendant's only justification was his inability to locate
his alibi witness; the trial court concluded that this explanation was
unsatisfactory.
5 8
The Taliaferro decision is consistent with those jurisdictions hold-
ing that continuances will not be granted absent a showing of good
cause for noncompliance with the applicable notice of alibi provision.59
Continuances are of limited feasibility in jury trials60 because of the
substantial time interval between the presentation of the state's evi-
dence and the defendant's evidence of an alibi. A continuance disrupts
the judicial process and, quite possibly, may affect the ultimate disposi-
tion of the case.6 1 In Taliaferro, the facts were too outrageous to justify
53. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 137-38 (1974);
Comment, supra note 50, at 1353. See generally Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine
of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964).
54. Maryland Rule 741(g) permits the court to grant a continuance. For the full text
of the rule, see supra note 6.
55. Id; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(e) (same requirement in federal criminal
cases).
56. Jackson v. State, 288 Md. 191, 194, 416 A.2d 278, 281 (1980) (citing Jackson v.
State, 214 Md. 454, 459, 135 A.2d 638, 640 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 940
(1958)). In addition, "the party requesting the continuance should show: that he
had a reasonable expectation of securing the evidence of the absent witness or
witnesses within some reasonable time, that the evidence was competent and ma-
terial, and he believed the case could not be fairly tried without it.... .Jackson
v. State, 288 Md. 191, 194, 416 A.2d 278, 281 (1980).
57. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 394, 456 A.2d 29, 39, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2114
(1983).
58. Taliaferro, 295 Md. at 392, 456 A.2d at 38.
59. Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wis-
consin have expressed good cause exceptions in their notice of alibi statutes. Id
at 387-88 n.12, 456 A.2d at 36 n.12.
60. Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1276, 1293
(1966).
61. In a recent decision the court of appeals held that a trial judge had abused his
discretion by excluding the testimony of an undisclosed alibi witness because of
the defendant's failure to comply with the notice requirement of Maryland Rule
741(d)(3). Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 466 A.2d 1286 (1983). In Colter, the trial
judge applied a "hard and fast rule of not granting a continuance." Id at 428, 466
A.2d at 1289. The Colter court cited Taliaferro and distinguished the two by de-
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the granting of a continuance. A jury was involved and the state had
presented its case prior to the motion for a continuance. Under these
particular circumstances, the granting of a continuance was not a via-
ble alternative because the state would have been severely prejudiced.
In Taliaferro, the defendant's clear failure to comply with the no-
tice provisions precluded any protracted discussion of the constitu-
tional considerations. Thus, the Taliaferro court set no standard for
determining the weight of an individual's sixth amendment right to
compulsory process. In light of the facts of Taliaferro, any constitu-
tional weighing process was unnecessary. Had disclosure been made a
few weeks prior to trial, however, the court would have had to analyze
the constitutional issue. Under these circumstances, the right of a de-
fendant to present a defense would clearly outweigh any procedural
interest of the state. Therefore, the constitutional implications of the
preclusion of alibi testimony would have to be judicially resolved.
With respect to an individual's sixth amendment rights, the
Supreme Court has stated that "[flew rights are more fundamental than
that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."62 A de-
fendant's right to present evidence on his own behalf, while fundamen-
tal, is not absolute. In the exercise of this right, the defendant must
comply with the applicable procedural rules.6 3 A defendant's right to
present evidence on his own behalf is not a right to ignore otherwise
reasonable rules of procedure designed to ascertain guilt and inno-
cence.64 After all, the sixth amendment does not confer the right to
present testimony "free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial
system." 65
In Taliaferro v. State, the legitimate demands of the adversarial
system required the defendant to comply with the Maryland proce-
dural rule to be guaranteed his constitutional protections. The
Supreme Court must reach the issue of what effect an exclusionary or-
der has on a defendant's right to obtain witnesses in his own behalf,
and thereby eliminate the constitutional confusion presented by notice
of alibi provisions.
Stuart R. Berger
daring that in Taliaferro "the trial court gave thorough consideration to a contin-
uance before rejecting that alternative." ld. at 429, 466 A.2d at 1290. In contrast,
the trial judge in Colter did not consider the factors enumerated in United States
v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), when determining the propriety of the
trial court's discretionary exclusion of alibi testimony. See supra text at note 25.
The court distinguished Colter from Taliaferro by examining the methodology by
which the trial court reached its decision to exclude the witness. Colter, 297 Md.
at 429, 466 A.2d at 1289.
62. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
63. Id
64. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975).
65. Id
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